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The object of contractual theories is describing exchange relation between agents, considering institutional 
and informational restriction in which they evolve.  
From trials of removing insufficiency in contractual theories new representations gradually appeared, of 
enterprise organizational order, which take exception to neoclassical model and surpass the contractual 
paradigm,  without  rejecting  it.  Common  elements  of  these  new  types  of  organization  are:  using  new 
informational and communication technologies, trial of respecting higher consumer demand, mobile and 
recreational structures in which individuals must adapt permanently to unpredictable events and market 
uncertainty. Far from converging to a unique model, these new forms of organization are varied and often 
hybrid.  The  most  popular  in  literature  are  network  organization,  virtual  organization  and  learning 
organization. 
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1. Contractual approach of firm 
The  contractual  approach  of  firm  is  based  upon  concepts  and  results  of  game  theory  and 
information economics, which analyse agents’ behaviour in different strategic environments and 
in the conditions of asymmetry and information imperfection.   
In  the  contractual  model  firm  appears  as  a  coalition  of  actors  which contributes  at  the  well 
functioning of organization in exchange of a satisfying retribution. Management art consist in 
maintaining  coalition  and  capacity  of  serving  clients  efficiently  (which  means  better  than 
competition). J. G. March and H. A. Simon (1958) insist in management role, and R. M. Cyert 
and J. G. March (1963) emphasize certain general organization practice (sequence and secret 
treatment of matters, preference for short deadline, preference for already experimented solution 
etc.). 
Contractual paradigm takes into account the human functioning of productive organization which 
is  the  enterprise.  Its  object  is  describing  exchange  relation  between  agents,  considering 
institutional and informational restriction in which they evolve.  
We can distinguish more families of models in the frame of contract theory, sending to different 
economic preoccupation. The most known are: transaction cost theory, property right theory and 
positive theory of agency. 
1.1. Transaction cost theory  
Transaction  cost  theory  offers  a  useful  frame  of  decision  internalization  or  externalization 
analysis  of  transaction.  Based  upon  two  hypotheses  (limited  rationality  and  individual 
opportunism), this theory identifies a connection between the nature of transaction (the degree of 
incertitude  of  transaction,  frequency  of  transaction  and  active  specificity)  and  institutional 
arrangements which will be chosen by individuals: market hierarchy or hybrid form (cooperation 
between  firms).  Most  efficient  organization  manners  are  those  which  minimize  costs  of 
transaction owed to exchange, costs connected to negotiation, surveillance and contract control. 
There  are  three  ways  of  coordination:  complementary  activities  (corresponding  to  different 296 
 
phases  of  production  process)  and  similar  (which  need  same  knowledge,  experience  and 
capacity) will be coordinated through firm, and strictly complementary activities, though un-
similar will be coordinated ex-ante by cooperation agreements and ex-post by market transaction. 
Despite and un-contestable empirical balance sheet, the transactional cost theory made the object 
of numerous critiques. A first critique consists in the fact that the role of opportunism, considered 
a central variable of the theory, is overestimated. In this concern, L. Donaldson (1995) brings 
three arguments: 
- Opportunism is a regressive concept concerning human behaviour. This concept reminds the X 
theory of Mac Gregor, in which the individual is selfish, lazy, untrustworthy, always following 
own interest and must be checked (through rewards and punishments). 
-  Opportunism  does  not  reflect  variability  of  management  behaviour.  As  for  L.  Donaldson, 
opportunism is n just one of the possible behaviour of manager, which is generally privileged on 
short term. The game theory demonstrates that on long term the cooperation strategies are more 
profitable. The author ascertains that between all academic research connected with transactional 
cost theory and practice there is an obvious gap. 
- Opportunism raises inevitable issues of empirical order. Information concerning a “deviant” 
behaviour of managers is hard to obtain. 
Another author which considers the role of opportunism as being overestimates in O. Williamson 
theory is C. Perrow (1986). He disputes the diminishing of transaction costs in the case of vertical 
integration, showing that in the case of merging of two firms some costs (like the one connected 
with losing organization flexibility) increase, such a fact is not due to actors’ opportunism. 
Some recent analysis suggest that trust plays an important part in the majority of transaction and 
certain signal, visible or not, allow the maintaining of trust and diminishing risk probability 
associated with exchange (B. Baudry, 1994). 
R. Coase himself, the founder of transaction cost theory, contradicts O. Williamson thesis, by 
questioning  two  central  arguments  of  transactional  cost  theory:  opportunism  and  active 
specificity, as explicative factors of the vertical integration decision in the detriment of choosing 
market. R. Coase estimates that the individual predisposition to opportunism is limited in the 
manner in which the behaviour will affect future transaction as a consequence to bad reputation 
obtained. As well as rationality, opportunism becomes thus limited, for not being profitable on 
long term. 
Another critique upon basic concepts of transactional costs theory belongs to M. Granovetter 
(1985) and to S. Goshal and P. Moran (1996), which tries to demonstrate that applying theory is 
dangerous  to  managers  for  the  hypotheses  and  logic  of  their  fundament.  He  criticizes  O. 
Williamson for he does not make the distinction between opportunism as an inclination (attitude) 
and opportunism as behaviour manifestation. Psychology and organization theory show that the 
two concepts (attitude and behaviour) are different and influenced by individual and contextual 
mood. 
Another critique belongs to S. Wolff (1996) who suggests including the manners of network 
organization in a historical time dimension. This approach emphasizes dynamic factors which 
allow analyzing agreements between enterprises from a perspective of creating values and not 
minimizing costs. Id est, agreements between enterprises represent a solution in the case of new 
and  risky  activities,  allowing  the  eventual  cease  of  alliance  after  reaching  its  purpose.  This 
flexibility allows obviating an irreversible decision (e.g. a merger – acquisition) to the time of 
uncertainty decrease.  
Another author who critiques transactional cost is A. Bienaymé (1998). He states that the level of 
costs in structural exchange, of disinvestment, of decentralization is very high, and the passage 
from a manner of organization to another is not made rapidly. Thus, the marginal reasoning 
which included choice of market, hierarchy or a hybrid organizational manner for developing 
transactions  seem  inadequate.  The  author  underlines  that  the  passage  from  a  hierarchy 297 
 
coordination manner to a manner of coordination by transaction market is more difficult with the 
development of professionalism in the exercise of productive activity and with the existence of a 
productivity dynamic connected with the integration of a worker inside firm and his knowledge. 
The  enterprise  elaborates  and  takes  decision  at  a  more  efficient  level  that  an  unorganized 
assembly, for it “dissolves complexity”. 
The enterprise seems less susceptible of mobility and flexibility than the individual producer of 
pure and perfect competition on a walrasian market. 
Despite critiques brought to it, the transactional cost theory offers a useful frame of decision 
analysis of internalisation or externalisation of transaction. Also, it allowed the reconsideration of 
a great number of problems, such as: choosing financing methods for firms; work organization, 
internal organization structure of enterprise; industrial politics. 
1.2. Property right theory 
The best known founders of property right theory are: R. Coase (1960), A. Alchian (1959, 1961, 
1965),  H.  Demsetz  (1966,  1967),  H.  Manne  (1965),  S.  Cheung  (1969),  E.  Furubotn  and  S. 
Pejovich (1972, 1974) and L. De Alessi (1983). Having different professions (economists, jurists) 
these developed a pluridisciplinary analysis of property rights. 
Property right theory has an important part in understanding firm. It is based on the idea that any 
relation between the economic agents can be considered an exchange of property rights upon 
some goods. Adepts of this theory consider the existence of well determined property rights is an 
essential condition of individual initiative. Maximising each individual utility must develop a 
growth of collective efficacy, and the diverse ways of motivation are influenced my property 
rights structures (E. Furubotn, S. Pejovich, 1974). 
There are some gaps in property rights theory, the most important consists in the actual defining 
of  these  rights,  which  is  based  on  the  existence  of  free  contractual  relations  which  lead, 
necessarily,  to  choosing  the  most  efficient  system.  Strictly  founded  on  methodological 
individualism,  the  property  rights  theory  aims  only  the  interindividual  relations,  contractual 
relations  between  agents,  excluding  the  analysis  of  power  reports  between  several  actors  of 
enterprise. This limit of property rights is partially compensated by its integration in agency 
theory, moreover in its present development. 
1.3. Positive theory of agency 
The essential component of positive theory of agency are present in founding articles of M. 
Jensen and W. Meckling (1976), M. Jensen (1983) and E. Fama and M. Jensen (1983a, 1983b). 
Positive theory of agency represents an integrated theory of organizations, which aim to reuniting 
two different research trends: research base on market functioning and the one associated with 
psychology domain, sociology, organizational behaviour, anthropology, biology, having as an 
objective explaining human behaviour, as well as individually and socially. 
The central spot which the manager occupies in the positive theory of agency, made this theory 
play a determinant part in management branches development. If at the beginning the positive 
theory of agency seemed a financial theory, it rapidly extended to other domains, for proposing 
new accountancy analysis, management control, and human resources management, management 
of production or marketing. Positive theory of agency is at the origin of many new theoretical 
domains such as “corporatist governing”. Along with transaction cost theory, positive theory of 
agency became one of the main “grammars” used in management sciences. 
Present research in positive theory of agency aims for four main axis (M. Jensen, W. Meckling, 
1980):  
a. Shaping the nature of human behaviour. The objective is of building a human behaviour model 
which integrates the work results of economists, psychologists, neurosciences specialists with the 
purpose  of  understanding  rational  behaviour  (calculated)  and  irrational.  This  concern  to 
undertake at the level of individual same effort undertook at the level of organization. 298 
 
b. Studying systems of performance measurement, of remuneration and promotion. M. Jensen 
and K. Murphy (1988) and M. Jensen and K.J. Murphy (1990) papers this axis has as a purpose 
providing human resources management theories which the managers can base on for conceiving 
and  putting  in  practice  system  to  allow  a  better  use  of  human  resources  in  the  frame  of 
organization. The effort of theorizing is integrator, considering as well as the problems of labour 
economy and human resources, and in the human behaviour sciences or from traditional research 
trends in management control. 
c. Connections between tasks structure, organizational barriers and the technology process nature. 
Studying these has as a purpose understanding the manner in which diverse systems connect to 
organization and markets allow a better use of opportunities offered by different technologies. In 
other  terms,  is  to  analyse  relations  between  the  nature  of  technological  process  and  the 
organizational structure. This axis relatively new in the frame of contractual perspective allows 
solving a problem emphasized often by these theories, that of neglecting production phenomena. 
d. Connections between systems of governing, enterprise finances and organization performance. 
The objective of this study is to understand the way in which firm relation with providers of 
capital influence the strategy, manners of taking decisions and creating and distribution of value. 
This  axis  includes  especially  the  papers  concerning  society  governance,  focused  upon 
organizational rules of game which restrict manager decision (e.g. administrative board). Papers 
concerning  enterprise  governance  are  in  direct  connection  with  research  of  firm  finances, 
especially with those concerning financing and property structures. 
Focused initially on an external view of organization, papers from this last axis, especially those 
used in enterprise finances, based on evaluation, had the tendency to neglect internal aspects, 
which are though the most important for understanding creation of value. Present research tries to 
integrate internal governing aspects, such as formulating strategy or distributing of decisional 
power in hierarchy. These problems must allow understanding the manner to take decision of 
investment, subject neglected paradoxically by financial research, as underlined by M. Jensen 
(1993).  Beyond  the investment  decision,  research  themes  also concerns  restructuring  or new 
forms of property structures, as LBO or employees-shareholders. 
The main part of positive theory of agency is attributed to specific knowledge, as well as to 
evolution known by rationality shaping, on which it is based, tend to approach, especially the 
most recent development, by the evolutionist theory or strategic theory, which attributes a main 
spot to resources and competence.  Positive theory of agency could be such considered from a 
point of view a first attempt of compromise between theories founded on opportunism and the 
ones based on knowledge. 
 
2. Theories based on knowledge 
Theories  based  on  knowledge  suggest  new  organizational  models  based  on  global 
competitiveness,  on  trust  between  partners  and  on  collective  cognitive  apparatus.  The  most 
known  of  these  are  the  network  organization,  the  virtual  organization  and  the  learning 
organization. 
2.1. The network enterprise  
Firms are experiencing substantial transformations related to the rapid advance of information 
technology and economic environment. We can see today the emergence of networks of small 
and  medium  firms;  subcontracting  and  outsourcing  between  large  and  small  companies; 
decentralize the units of large corporations, particularly multinational corporations. The trend is 
not only towards the desegregation of business activities, but towards the cooperation between 
units. What emerges from this trend is a new organization form: the network enterprise. This not 
mean a network of enterprises, but the actual unit of business operation, made up of different 
companies or segments of companies, as well as of consultants and temporary workers attached 
to specific projects.  299 
 
The network enterprise concentrates only on activities which can very well achieve and which 
profit  on  partners’  competence  for  externalizing  the  other  activities.  Acting  as  such,  firm 
diminishes costs, gains flexibility, has access to varied resources, reduces risk associated with its 
projects and simplifies internal structure.  
2.2. The virtual organization  
The  virtual  organization  appeared  as  a  consequence  to  product  demand  growth  and  specific 
services, named virtual.  
The virtual enterprise can be defined as a temporary alliance of partners who work together for 
sharing competence and resources for market satisfaction, using computer networks and calculus 
informational technologies.  
Virtual organizations have a high capacity of adjustments. They are characterized through fast 
and international deliveries, responding to a diverse request, by rolling services of great quality, 
small prices, and a great speed of traded values circulation. 
2.3. The learning enterprise  
The learning enterprise is the organization which has the aptitude of creating, acquisitioning and 
transfer  knowledge.  Thus  is  the  enterprise  which  “learns”  and  adapt  in  consequence.  The 
experience and adaptation can bring the firm various advantages to its competitors.  
The  attributes  of  as  learning  organization  are  flexibility,  adaptability,  autonomy,  integration 
capacity etc. 
In practice, more often the three models interpenetrate, and organization can have in the same 
time characteristics of all three models. 
 
3. Conclusions 
In contractual theories the firm is considered a network of contracts, of policy and agreements 
between individuals who constitute it (employees, managers, clients, providers, investors etc.). 
The starting point of this type of approach is different. Thus, transaction cost theory is based on 
the  notion  of  transaction;  positive  theory  of  agency  starts  form  the  divergences  of  interest 
between partners of collaboration and the cost of these conflicts, while  property right theory 
emphasizes  the  structure  of  property  rights.  Though,  considering  the  conflicts  concerning 
property  rights  are  most  which  can  appear  between  agents  and  any  collaboration  agreement 
implies  a  transaction  over  these  rights,  there  are  meeting  points  of  these  three  theories.  On 
scientific  point  of  view,  the  three  approaches  have  in  common  choosing  methodological 
individualism and retaining the hypothesis of individual rationality. 
Contractual theories suppose sophisticated maximising behaviours which lead to signing complex 
contracts which do not correspond to practice. Majority of results is obtained considering that 
individuals sign complete contracts which take into account all possibilities of achievement of 
random  events.  Except  insurance  domain,  contracts  met  in  real  economic  life  are  not  as 
sophisticated as the theory suggests. They do not solve ex ante all problems which may appear 
between parts and are neither perfectly incentive, nor optimal. 
Theories  based  on  knowledge  overpass  contractual  paradigm  without  rejecting  it.  They 
emphasize collective cognitive apparatus, on global competiveness, on trust between partners and 
suggest organizational models based on mobile and reactive structures, in which decisions are 
distributed in various parts. Relations on long term with employees, providers and clients are 
current and essential for developing systems in the frame of which the price is no longer the 
engine of individual behaviour. Based on these long term relations and on constant evolution of 
technology, strategic decision aims achieving systems and alliances able to respond in a supple 
and coherent manner to difficulties an uncertain future presents. 
In spite success registered by new organizational models, for enterprises, more important than 
imitating them, remain mastering evolution processes and strategic adaptation. Considering each 300 
 
enterprise has a history and characteristics of own organizational configuration, future seems to 
be that of a plurality of organization ways and hybrid forms. 
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